Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo et al : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Kent Shearer; Neslen and Mock; Attorneys for Appellant;
Ned Warnock; Critchlow, Watson & Warnock; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, No. 10162 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4629

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

~LED

OWYHEE, INC., a corporation,
,t
·I
Plaintiff_, Garnishee Plaintiff
and A. ppellant_,

AUG 1 7 1964

vs.

ROBBINS MARCO POLO, aka and
dba ROBBINS MARK-O-POLO, a
corporation, and ROBBINS TRAVEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
corporation,
Defendants and judgment debtors_,

Case No.
10162

vs.

DWIGHT G. LUMAN,
Garnishee defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal of Owyhee, Inc., from the Judgment of the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Bon. Stewart M. Hanson, Presiding

Kent Shearer
Neslen and Mock
Attorneys for Appellant
1003 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Ned Warnock
Critchlow, Watson & Warnock
Attorneys for Respondent
414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLI1~

OF CONTENTS AND ST1\.TEMENT
OF POINTS
Page

Additional Statement of Facts ------------------··-···········

3

1\ rgun1en t ..... _____ ------------------------------------------------------------

4

Point 1:

.\SALE OF STOCK HAS NOT BEEN EST..:\ BT. I SHED -------------------------------------------··--------------- 4
Point

~

IN GARNISHMENT APPELLANT l-IAS
O~LY THE RIGHTS OF THE DEBTOR
,\GAINST GARNISHEE.------·-·--·---------·-··----···---- 5
Point 3

THE CASE OF PACE vs. PACE BROS. IS
NOT APPLICABLE. ··--·------·-----······--·-·····------------

7

Conclusion ---------------··---------··-·-----------····-······---·--·--·-···-·

8

INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
King Ys. Firm, 3 U 2nd 419, 285 P. 2nd 1117............
Pace Ys. Pace Bros., 91 U 132 59 P 2nd 1 ................
Slim Olsen, Inc. vs. Winegar, 122 U 80,
24() P 2nd 608 ·--············-····················-············--·-·

6
7
6

RULE CITED
Rule 13 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ··············--·-

6

TEXT CITED
6 Am. J ur. 2nd 610 ·-------·----·-·--------------·--····-····----------

5

1

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
0\VYIIEE, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff_, Garnishee Plaintiff
and Appellant_,
vs.

ROBBINS lVIARCO POLO, aka and
dba ROBBINS MARK-O-POLO, a
corporation, and ROBBINS TRAVEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
corporation,
Defendants and judgment debtors_,

Case No.
10162

vs.

D'\TIGHT G. LUMAN,
Garnishee defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENl_,

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
'Ye feel it is pertinent to the issues of this case
that the following facts should be called to the Court's
attention. The record (Transcript-page 2) and the
3
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pretrial order (Record Pages 8 & 9) will disclose that
prior to the indebtedness incurred by Robbins to Owyhee, Inc. an action was filed by Luman against Robbins
on the note given and Luman obtained a judgment.
No defense to the action was interposed by either the
corporation or by Robbins as an individual. We concede that appellant is not trying to collect the money
paid as a result of the judgment.

ARGUMENT
Point 1
A SALE OF STOCK HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.
The evidence is not controverted that the original
conversations contemplated a purchase of stock by the
Respondent. There is evidence that an agreement was
drawn (Tr. 5) but no evidence that the agreement was
ever executed and no specific evidence as to its contents. All of the evidence in this matter is secondary
evidence. There is no specific evidence as to how the
$4,000.00 was entered on the books of the company.
The only act which would indicate an intention of a
sale was the purported election of respondent as a
director. He never qualified. ( Tr. 20.)
All actions taken by the parties subsequently were
that the $4,000.00 was to be treated as a loan and to
that end the corporation and Robbins executed and
delivered the promissory note. The fact that Robbins

4

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

signed the note personally would indicate that the note
was not given as a repurchase of stock.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the
note was given to repurchase stock which was never
dtlivered and as far as this record is concerned that
any entry of the transaction was made in the books of
the corporation.
The record is so incomplete relating to the transaction that the Court would have to guess as to what
transpired, and on the evidence could not possibly make
a finding.
Point 2

IN GARNISHMENT APPELLANT HAS
ONLY THE RIGHTS OF THE DEBTOR
AGAINST THE GARNISHEE.
The law is stated in 6 Am. Jur. 2nd at page 610
as follows:
"The test of the liability of one as garnishee
is ordinarily whether he has property, funds, or
credits in his hands belonging to the principal
debtor for the recovery of which the latter has a
present subsisting cause of action. In other
words, persons who are liable to suit generally
and who have property of, or indebted to, the
principal defendant, are liable to suit by the
defendant with respect to such property or indebtedness."
The record shows that an action was commenced
5
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and judgment was obtained by Luman against the
debtor corporation and Robbins.
Rule 13, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
as follows:
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims: A pleading
shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at
the time of serving the pleading the pleader has
against any opposting party, if it arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the Court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not
be so stated if at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action.
Any action which the corporate debtor had against
Luman had to be plead at the time Luman sued, otherwise it is forever barred.
King vs. Firm, 3 U 2nd 419, 285 P. 2nd 1117
Slim Olsen, Inc., vs. Winegar, 122 U 80, 246 P.
2nd 608
This would include any claim the corporation
might have had for the $1,900.00 paid prior to the suit
and now claimed by the appellant.
The appellant standing in the shoes of the corporate
debtor is barred from claiming against the respondent.
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Point 3

'TilE CASE OF PACE VS. PACE BRO~. IS
XOT 1\PPLICABLE.
'fhe appellant must premise his entire case 1n Pace
vs. Pace Bros., 91 U 132, 59 P. 2nd, Page I.
1. The facts in the two cases are not similar. Jus-

tice 'Volfe premised his entire opinion on the following
qualifications found at page 2 of 59 P. 2nd.

" * * * We consider the question as to whether
the defendant corporation, under the circumstances in which this purchase was made, had
authority to buy its own stock held by Sidney
Pace. Our decision on that question will be
strictly as to the facts of this case." (Italics ours).
The facts in the Pace case are that Sidney Pace
was one of the founders and large stockholders of the
corporation Pace Bros., a large landowner and stock
ratsmg company. Sidney Pace sold his stock to the
corporation and as consideration for the stock received
notes secured by mortgages on the land of the corporation. There was no cash paid to Sidney Pace, his
estate, or his heir. The heir of Sidney Pace, his only
son, commenced an action on the notes and to foreclose
the mortgages. At the time the action was commenced
the corporation, Pace Bros., was insolvent. Creditors
of the corporation intervened in the foreclosure action
claiming that the purchase of the Sidney Pace stock by
the corporation was void. The Supreme Court of Utah
so held.
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The Court in its decision based it primarily on the
theory that to foreclose on the land of the corporation
would impair its capital to the detriment of its creditors.
The capital of the corporation had not already been
impaired and so there is no ruling relative to recoupment of impaired capital, if any.
In this present action, if there was an impairment
of capital, which we deny, the impairment took place
before the debt being collected was incurred. The reasoning in the Pace case that a creditor could look to
the capital of a corporation in dealing with it does not
apply, the capital was not there when Owyhee and
Robbins did business.

CONCLUSION
The appellant in trying to collect from the respondent is reaching for the last straw~ No person involved in a law suit could ever feel secure if actions such
as this were successful.
Respectfully submitted,
Ned Warnock of the law firm of
CRITCHLOW, WATSON & WARNOCK
Attorneys for Respondent
414 "\tValker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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